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FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF FREE
SPEECH IN PUBLIC AIRPORTS
ERIC J. CARLSON
IT'S A familiar scene. A crowded airport terminal full of
busy air travellers. As they walk to and from their gates,
travellers are approached along the way by a number of
persons attempting to either hand out literature or solicit
a contribution in support of a supposedly worthy cause.
Although some air travellers disregard these persons as
just a minor annoyance, others strongly oppose allowing
such activities in a busy airport.
This Comment will provide a broad overview of the
constitutional issues raised by the exercise of first amend-
ment activities in a government owned airport. The Com-
ment will focus on two specific issues: first,. whether
municipal airports are public forums where acts, of self-
expression are entitled to the highest degree of constitu-
tional protection,' and second, what the constitutional
limitations on the government's right to restrain free
speech in airports are and how these limitations have
been applied by the courts to specific types of airport reg-
ulations governing the exercise of expressive activity.2
I. THE AIRPORT AS A PUBLIC FORUM
The first amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed which abridges a per-
son's fundamental right to express himself freely.3 Free-
, See infra notes 3-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
" See infra notes 83-186 and accompanying text for an analysis of this subject.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of this amendment is as follows: "Con-
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dom of speech is generally considered one of the most
important of the constitutional guarantees 4 and serves a
number of important functions.5  It is a right that is de-
serving of protection, even if the expression is distasteful
or offensive to a majority of citizens.6 Yet freedom of
speech is not afforded absolute protection. It is well es-
tablished that the first amendment does not license a per-
son to say anything he pleases, whenever or wherever he
desires. 7 The government may, subject to limitation, reg-
ulate the exercise of free speech.
A crucial factor to consider in determining what restric-
tions may be placed upon freedom of expression is the
location of the questioned activity. First amendment pro-
tection of free speech does not extend equally to all lo-
cales; therefore, an expressive act that is permissible in
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id
4 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (declaring that freedom of
speech is one of the "indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment" and possesses "a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (stating that freedom
of speech is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom").
For a detailed look at these important functions, see Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
6 Rosenfeld v. NewJersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902 (1972) ("When we undermine the
general belief that the law will give protection against fighting words and profane
and abusive language . . .we take steps to return to the law of the jungle.");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (while freedom of speech may
produce "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance," such conse-
quences are "in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which
the process of open debate permits us to achieve").
7 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19 ("[Tlhe First and Fourteenth Amendments have never
been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or
wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he
chooses."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("The rights of free
speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any
public place and at any time."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(freedom of speech and the press "does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose... ").
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one particular place may be prohibited in another.8
Prior to the 1900s, the Supreme Court apparently did
not distinguish between private and public property when
examining the constitutionality of challenged first amend-
ment activities. 9 The government could forbid in a public
place that which a private citizen could forbid in his own
home.' 0 The Court gradually abandoned this position
and recognized that the government's right to control
public property was not absolute. Specifically, the Court
determined that government regulation of public prop-
erty could not prevail over the peoples' right of access to
certain public areas traditionally used for the exchange of
information and ideas."1
8 See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jail grounds not an appropriate
place for public demonstrations).
9 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). Davis concerned a Boston city
ordinance that forbade "any public address" on any publicly owned property un-
less a permit was obtained from the mayor. Id. at 44. In upholding the ordinance,
Chief Justice White, speaking for the Court, stated that the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution "does not have the effect of creating a particular and
personal right in the citizens to use public property in defiance of the ... laws of
the States." Id. at 47-48.
10 See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd sub nom
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). Justice Holmes, while a judge in the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, declared, "[for the legislature abso-
lutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113.
11 See Hague v. Committee For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, the
Supreme Court struck down a Jersey City ordinance forbidding all public meet-
ings in the streets and other public places without a permit. Id. at 516. Justice
Roberts, in a plurality opinion, rejected the city's contention that the ordinance
was clearly constitutional under Davis, see supra note 9, and in a much quoted piece
of dictum stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thought between citizens, and discussing public questions .... The
privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may be regulated
in the interest of all.., but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
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A. Classifications of Government Owned Property
Not all public property is entitled to the same degree of
constitutional protection. The Supreme Court expressly
recognized at least three distinct types of government
owned property in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association.' 2 The first category recognized in
Perry was the traditional, or classic, public forum, de-
scribed as those places that have been used historically for
assembly and debate.' 3 The Court specifically mentioned
streets and parks as examples of traditional public fo-
rums.' 4 One of the major purposes of the traditional pub-
lic forum is to foster and promote the exchange of
information and ideas.' 5 The ability of the people to use
such locations for this purpose has, since ancient times,
been one of the basic rights and privileges of citizens.' 6
Thus, in this type of forum, communicative activity is to
be afforded the highest degree of constitutional protec-
tion, and the government's right to restrict self-expres-
sion is sharply limited.' 7 The state may not prohibit all
expressive activity in a traditional public forum.'8
Futhermore, regulations governing the time, place, and
,2 460 U.S. 37 (1983). Perry concerned a dispute between two rival teachers'
unions over the right of access to an interschool mail system and teacher mail-
boxes. Id. at 37-38. Because private nonschool connected groups, such as the
Cub Scouts, periodically used these mail facilities, one of the unions argued that
the facilities were a limited public forum from which they could not be excluded.
Id. at 47-48. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, noting that
the mail system had never been open for indiscriminate use by the general public
and concluded that the system was instead a nonpublic forum. Id.
,, Id. at 45.
14 Id.
,5 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) ("[A] principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of
ideas .... ).
,6 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16. For a more detailed discussion of the traditional
public forum, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 1. See also Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1287 (1979).
11 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1983) (stating that the federal
government could not ban flags and banners from the sidewalks surrounding the
Supreme Court grounds since these sidewalks constitute a public forum and the
government's power to restrict expression in such places is "very limited").
- Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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manner of expression that do not discriminate on the ba-
sis of content must be narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant state interest and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.19
The next category of government owned property rec-
ognized by the Court was the designated, or limited, pub-
lic forum. Unlike the traditional public forum, this second
category consists of public property which the govern-
ment, at its discretion, has voluntarily made available to
the public for the purpose of expressive activity.20 This
type of public forum may be opened to the public at large
for any kind of assembly or speech, or it may be created
for a limited purpose, such as, for example, the discussion
of certain subjects, or for use by certain groups.2' Exam-
ples of a designated public forum recognized in Perry in-
clude university meeting facilities, school board meetings,
and municipal theaters. 22 While the government is not re-
quired to maintain the open nature of such facilities, so
long as it does, regulations limiting free speech must fol-
low the same standards and rules which protect self-ex-
pression in traditional public forums.2
The third and final category discussed in Perry was the
nonpublic forum, defined as public property that has not
been opened to public expression by either tradition or
government designation.2 4 In this type of forum, commu-
19 Id. The state may also enforce content-based exclusions, but only if they are
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling government interest. Id.
20 Id. at 45-46.
21 Id. at 46 n.7.
22 Id. at 45-46. The Court cited to three of its earlier decisions in recognizing
these examples. These decisions are as follows: Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (university meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meet-
ing); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S 546 (1975) (municipal
theater).
23 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
24 Id. For court decisions holding that various types of public property do not
constitute either category of public forum, see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising space inside a publicly owned bus is not
a public forum) and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788 (1985) (the Combined Federal Campaign, a fund-raising program for
charity held in the federal work place, is not a public forum).
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nicative activity is not guarded by the same high degree of
constitutional protection as that which applies in public
forums, and thus, regulation of speech and debate are
governed by less strict standards. Specifically, the govern-
ment may preserve a nonpublic forum for its intended use
by adopting regulations that are "reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public offi-
cials oppose the speaker's view." 25 Jailhouse grounds, 6
military bases, 27 and prisons28 are examples of govern-
ment property that have not been opened to the govern-
ment for purposes of self-expression.
Since public forums are s ubject to more protective stan-
dards than nonpublic forums, the extent to which the gov-
ernment may limit expressive activity depends on whether
a particular forum is classified as public or nonpublic.
Therefore, a court attempting to assess the constitutional-
ity of airport regulations restricting free speech must first
determine whether an airport terminal is a public forum.
This issue will be examined in the following section.
B. Factors Supporting an Airport Being a Public Forum
The vast majority of federal courts which have ad-
dressed the forum status of a municipal airport have con-
cluded that such an airport is a public forum.29 Several
25 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
26 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). In Adderey, the Court up-
held the trespass conviction of 32 students who had entered the grounds of a
Florida jail to protest the previous arrest of their schoolmates. Id. at 40. Recog-
nizing that jails have not traditionally been open to the public, and that jails are
built for security purposes, the Court stated that the government "has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it was lawfully dedi-
cated." Id. at 47.
27 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-37 (1976) (upholding regulation
prohibiting leafletting on a military base since base was a restricted, closely super-
vised government compound and thus constituted a nonpublic forum).
28 See, e.g.,Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,
125 (1977) (prison held to be a nonpublic forum since "confinement [in prisons]
and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights,
including those derived from the first amendment, which are implicit in
incarceration").
29 SeeJews forJesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 795 (9th
Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569, 572 (1987); United States South-
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factors have been emphasized in support of this determi-
nation. Perhaps the most heavily cited factor is the close
similarity between the public areas of an airport terminal
and a city street. 30 Courts have noted that airport termi-
nals, like streets, are often lined by shops, restaurants,
newsstands, and other business establishments. 3 ' The
Fifth Circuit, in finding that the Dallas/Fort Worth airport
is a public forum, stated that "[tihe parallel between pub-
lic streets and the . . . central concourses of the D/FW
terminal buildings, where air travellers as well as the gen-
eral public may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear
and powerful .... 2
A factor closely related to the terminal-street resem-
blance is the fact that airport terminals are open and ac-
cessible to the general public, and not only to travellers.3 3
Any member of the public may enter an airport terminal
west Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760,
764-66 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1124 (1982); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of
Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski
v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D.
Wisc. 1978); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 425 F.
Supp. 734, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd in part, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978); Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180
(W.D. Mo. 1977); cf. Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.)
(large bus station is public forum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
so See, e.g., Chicago Area Military Project, 508 F.2d at 925 ("[Slpacious, city-owned
common areas ... resemble those public thoroughfares which have been long
recognized to be particularly appropriate places for the exercise of constitution-
ally protected rights to communicate ideas and information."); Gannett Satellite
Information Network v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 149-50 (D.N.J. 1989)
("[A]irports and streets are both natural gathering places for people with an inter-
est and expectation that certain types of public activity are permitted and in fact
will take place."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990).
31 See Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); see also United States Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 764
(visitors to the National and Dulles Airports in Washington D.C. enjoy "the bene-
fits of restaurants and snack bars, two post offices, various specialty shops, two
medical stations, at least five bars, a barber shop, drug stores, banks, newsstands,
and police stations").
32 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 627.
35 See id. ("The analogy between [airport] terminal concourses and public
streets is further strengthened by the lack of restrictions on public access to the
commercial establishments .... ").
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whether he or she plans to board an airplane or not. In
describing Chicago's O'Hare Airport, the Seventh Circuit
noted that "great numbers of people are freely admitted
to the public areas of the terminal buildings not only in
connection with air travel, but also for shopping, dining,
sightseeing, or merely to satisfy their curiosity. '34 Mil-
lions of persons annually pass through the nation's larger
airports,3 5 and this high turnover of people makes airport
terminals particularly attractive to those who wish to ex-
press their views to the greatest number of listeners
possible. 6
Another factor some courts have considered in deter-
mining that terminals are public forums is the presence of
statutes or ordinances which expressly recognize the
rights of airport demonstrators. For example, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that the City of St. Louis had effectively rec-
ognized the public forum status of its airport by adopting
a solicitation rule which stated that persons desiring to ex-
ercise their first amendment rights "shall be protected" in
their activities.3 7 A Missouri federal court likewise held
that a city airport ordinance permitting self-expression in
essence opened up the terminals to first amendment activ-
ities. 3 8 Additionally, the FAA, in promulgating solicita-
tion rules for the National and Dulles Airports in
Washington, D.C., observed that there was "no question"
-4 Chicago Area Military Project, 508 F.2d at 925.
35 See id. (90,000 transients visit Chicago's O'Hare Airport each day); see also
United States Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 764 (approximately 18 million people
pass through the concourses and walkways of the National and Dulles Airports in
Washington D.C.).
36 See Rochford, 585 F.2d at 272 (public areas of airports "are particularly desira-
ble to those who wish to exercise their rights because of the unique quality of a
very high turnover of people in the airport").
11 Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1283. City Solicitation Rule 1.05 provided, among other
things, that persons wishing to utilize their constitutional freedoms "shall be pro-
tected in such activities, provided that the same do not constitute commercial ac-
tivities and do not result in interference with transportation functions of the
Airport." Id. at 1282.
-1 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp.
176, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (airport ordinance, rather than being strictly prohibi-
tory, permitted literature distribution upon the issuance of a permit and "[tihus
the ordinance, in essence, opens the forum... ").
that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
fully applied to the terminal buildings.3 9
C. Treatment by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to conclusively
resolve the airport forum issue in the case of Board of Air-
port Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. 40 In this
case, the Los Angeles airport board issued a resolution
banning all "First Amendment activities" within the Cen-
tral Terminal area of the Los Angeles International Air-
port (LAX). 4' The plaintiff, Jews for Jesus, Inc., a
nonprofit religious corporation, challenged the ordinance
by filing an action contending, among other complaints,
that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under
both the California and United States Constitutions be-
cause it prohibited all speech in a public forum.4 2 The
district court agreed that the resolution was facially un-
constitutional under the United States Constitution and
also held that the Central Terminal Area was a traditional
public forum under federal law.43 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling44 and expressly
stated that the LAX terminal was a traditional public fo-
39 United States Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 765. The FAA expressly noted:
There is a considerable amount of social and commercial in-
terchange in the terminals and, in many respects, the terminals are
like any other public thoroughfare where there is no question that
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, the exercise of
religion and the right to peaceable assembly apply. These activities
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, and they may not be
regulated by airport authorities in the same manner as commercial
activity.
Id.
40 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (hereinafter Jews for Jesus I1). See infra note 44 for full cite
to Jews for Jesus I.
41 Id. at 570. Resolution No. 13787 provided in pertinent part: "NOW,
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Airport Commissioners that
the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not open for
First Amendment activities by an individual and/or entity . Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 785 F.2d
791, 792 (9th Cir. 1986) (hereinafterJewsforJesus 1), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S.
569 (1987).
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rum.45 In arriving at this conclusion, the court stressed
that airport terminals bear a strong resemblance to city
streets and that the general public is freely admitted to
the airport for purposes other than air travel.46 The court
also reviewed the decisions of several other courts47 and
noted that every circuit court which had faced this issue
had come to the same conclusion.4 s
When the Supreme Court granted the case certiorari, it
appeared that the question of whether a municipal airport
terminal is a public forum would finally be settled. The
Court, however, decided that the resolution was unconsti-
tutionally broad regardless of whether or not an airport is
a traditional public forum.49 Thus, the forum status of the
LAX terminal was not addressed. Not all of the Court's
justices agreed with the decision to bypass the public fo-
rum issue, however. In a concurring opinion, Justice
White and Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed their view
that the Court should not have postponed ruling on the
issue, and that the opinion should not be interpreted as
an indication that a majority of the Court believed LAX to
be a traditional public forum.5
45 Id. at 795.
46 Id. at 794-95.
4 Id. The decisions referred to by the court are as follows: United States South-
west Africa, 708 F.2d at 760; Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 619; Rosen v. Port of Portland,
641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Chicago Area Military Project, 508 F.2d at 921; Kuszyn-
ski, 479 F.2d at 1130; Wolin, 392 F.2d at 83.
418 Jews for Jesus H, 785 F.2d at 795.
49 JewsforJesus 1, 482 U.S. at 573-74. Specifically, the Court stated, "Because we
conclude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine regardless of the proper standard, we need not decide
whether LAX is indeed a public forum . I..." Id.
-10 Id. at 577. The complete concurring opinion of Justice White, joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, is as follows:
Ijoin the Court's opinion but suggest that it should not be taken as
indicating that a majority of the Court considers the Los Angeles
International Airport to be a traditional public forum. That issue was
one of the questions on which we granted certiorari, and we should
not have postponed it for another day.
Id. Exactly why Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White felt it necessary to in-
clude this disclaimer in the opinion is unclear.
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D. Airports as Nonpublic Forums
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Jews for Jesus II,
one federal court has taken a stance opposing the view
that a municipal airport terminal is a public forum. In In-
ternational Caucus of Labor Committees v. Metropolitan Dade
County, Florida,5 1 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida defied the rulings of other
courts and held that the terminal buildings at the Miami
International Airport (MIA) were nonpublic forums.52
Dade County involved a Miami policy prohibiting the
erection of tables or signs in the public areas of MIA ter-
minals.5 3 In addressing a constitutional attack against this
rule, the court recognized that the degree of first amend-
ment protection varies according to the nature of the pub-
lic property in question, and therefore concluded that the
forum status of MIA terminals must first be established.5 4
After summarizing the three forum classifications estab-
lished in Perry,5 5 the court correctly noted that most courts
considering the character of municipal airport terminals
have not clearly stated whether they found the terminals
to be a traditional or designated public forum.56 While
the Dade County court recognized that both public forum
categories are subject to the same constitutional stan-
dards,57 it also realized that there are differences as to
what constitutes each type of public forum. The district
court therefore proceeded to separately determine
whether, first, the MIA terminals were traditional public
51 724 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
52 Id. at 924.
53 Id. at 919. Although the airport had a written ordinance governing first
amendment expression, the prohibition policy was not explicitly mentioned in the
ordinance, but rather was an unwritten rule. Id. The intended purpose of this
policy was to ensure that no barriers would inhibit the flow of passengers during
peak periods. Id. at 920.
- Id. at 921. The court specifically stated, "[b]ecause the extent of the First
Amendment protection varies with the character of the property to which speak-
ers seek access . . .[p]laintiffs' claims must be analyzed under the rubric of the
public forum doctrine." Id.
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forums, and, if not, whether the terminals were desig-
nated public forums.
In analyzing the first of these questions, the district
court strictly interpreted and applied the Perry definition
of a traditional public forum. 58  Noting that municipal air-
port terminals are not examples of public property that
historically have been used for communicative activities
and self-expression, the court summarily concluded that
the MIA terminals were not traditional public forums.59
With this issue out of the way, the court then proceeded
to examine whether airport terminals fell within the desig-
nated public forum category.
The primary authority used by the district court in ad-
dressing the designated public forum question was the
Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund.60 In Cornelius, the Court held that
a designated public forum is created only where the gov-
ernment intentionally opens a nontraditional forum for
public assembly and debate.6' To ascertain the required
governmental intent, the Court stated that two different
factors must be examined. First, courts must look to the
"policy and practice" of the state.62 In relation to this fac-
tor, the Supreme Court stated that the government does
not intentionally open a nontraditional forum by inaction
-- Id. The Supreme Court in Peny characterized traditional public forums as
"places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to as-
sembly and debate .... " Pery, 460 U.S. at 45.
D ade County, 724 F. Supp. at 923. Specifically, the court declared, "[T]his
Court finds that municipal airport terminals are not property that 'by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,' and thus
do not fall within the traditional public forum category." Id.
0 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Cornelius concerned a government policy aimed at limit-
ing the number of groups participating in a charity drive aimed at federal employ-
ees. Id. at 790. The Court held that this policy was constitutionally permissible in
that it was designed to minimize disruption of the federal workplace which was
recognized as a nonpublic forum. Id. at 805-06.
o' Id. at 802.
62 Id. The Court cited the case of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), as
an example of a government policy indicating the necessary intent to open a non-
traditional forum. In Widmar, a state university which had an express policy of
allowing student groups to use its meeting facilities was held to have created a
public forum for their use. Id. at 267.
[55
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or by permitting limited discourse.6 3 Second, the Court
asserted that the character of the property and "its com-
patibility with expressive activity" must also be ex-
amined. 64 The Court declared that governmental intent
will not be inferred when the nature of the property is in-
consistent with communicative activity, 65 and also empha-
sized that courts should be reluctant to find intent where
the principal function of the property in question would
be disrupted by expressive demonstrations.66
After summarizing the two factors enunciated in Come-
lius, 6 7 the district court in Dade County proceeded to sepa-
rately examine each factor in relation to MIA terminals.
First, the court declared that neither the written policy,
nor the actual practice of the county or MIA officials evi-
denced any governmental intent to open the terminals at
MIA to expressive activity. 6 The court noted that the
county had, instead, consistently tried to limit the exercise
of free speech at the airport. 69 Furthermore, the court
stated that the history of MIA reflected no indication that
the government wished to provide an open forum at the
terminals, 70 and that MIA was designed to deter disrup-
tion by "lessening the amount of expressive activity oc-
curring on the property. 71
Turning next to the nature and purpose of MIA termi-
nals, the court felt that an examination of this factor fur-
ther strengthened the conclusion that MIA is a nonpublic
6- Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 803.
- Id. at 804. The Court specifically stated, "[iln cases where the principal func-
tion of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is partic-
ularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a public
forum." Id.
67 Dade County, 724 F. Supp. at 921-22.
- Id. at 924.
69 Id. The court observed, "[Tlhe government's consistent policy has been to
limit participation at the MIA and to require parties seeking admission for First





1088 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
forum.72 The court specifically found that the primary
purpose of airports, such as MIA, is not communicative in
nature, but rather that airports exist to serve the relatively
narrow purpose of facilitating the public's transportation
needs. 73 Additionally, the district court held that the na-
ture of terminal buildings, especially those at crowded
and congested airports where travellers are often in a
hurry, was inconsistent with first amendment
expression. 4
E. Critique of Nonpublic Argument
While the court in Dade County concluded that MIA was
not a designated public forum by applying the factors
cited in Cornelius, a closer examination of these factors
reveals that this finding is far from certain and should not
be considered as authoritative. The policies and practices
at MIA may be very different from those at other airports.
For example, while the Dade County government appar-
ently never sought to encourage or even accommodate
expressive activities, the FAA, which administers National
and Dulles Airports in Washington, D.C., expressly recog-
nizes that first amendment activities are constitutionally
protected within the terminals of its airports.7" Similarly,
the city of St. Louis has also stated that first amendment
rights of freedom of expression "shall be protected" in its
airports. 76 Therefore, while the airport policies and prac-
tices of the Dade County government supposedly indi-
cated a lack of intent to open MIA for public assembly and
debate, the policies and practices of other airports may
support an opposite finding.
Additionally, the court's conclusory statement in Dade
County that the nature of congested airports is inconsistent
72 Id.
7, Id. The court concluded that railroad stations/terminals and bus stations/
terminals also were designed to serve this narrow purpose, and that transporta-
tion facilities "were never intended to play host to all of society's baggage." Id.
74 Id.
7- See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
with expressive activity is also subject to debate. While it
is true that persons exercising their first amendment
rights in airport terminals may sometimes annoy and dis-
tract airport users, this does not necessarily mean that
free speech is inconsistent with the function of a busy air-
port terminal. Through the use of constitutionally per-
missible time, place, and manner restrictions," the
disruption caused by expressive activity can be kept to an
acceptable level and pose no major obstacle to efficient air
travel. Furthermore, communicative activity is not con-
sidered inconsistent with the nature of a city street which,
like airport terminals, is designed to facilitate the move-
ment of people, and which may also be full of harried
travellers eager to reach their destinations.
Turning to the Dade County court's examination of
whether municipal airport terminals are traditional public
forums, it is apparent that the court's treatment of this
issue was inadequate. Noting that the Supreme Court in
Perry described traditional public forums as having a long
tradition of public assembly and debate,78 the Dade County
court apparently concluded that since airports are a rela-
tively recent phenomena, they could not fall within this
public forum category. Such a conclusion, however, is far
too simplistic. There is no indication that the Supreme
Court intended for its description to be so strictly con-
strued or applied as a test. Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier, public terminals bear a strong resemblance to city
streets, which are undoubtedly traditional public fo-
rums.79 Viewed in this light, municipal airport terminals
can justifiably be characterized as a "type" of street
merely transplanted into a new and more modern setting.
Courts have indeed recognized this argument and held
that transportation complexes are in reality small, self-
77 See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of these types of
restrictions.
78 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the simi-
larites between airport terminals and city streets.
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contained cities, with terminal passageways serving as
streets.80 Thus, although airports as a whole may be a re-
cent development, the public concourses, being a newly
evolved "form" of street, may still be fairly regarded as
having a long tradition of assembly and debate.
Furthermore, even though airport terminals technically
do not have an extensive history of free speech activities,
there is no reason that public property may not be consid-
ered a traditional public forum by close analogy to other
recognized traditional public forums. Absolutely requir-
ing a specific type of public property to have been in exist-
ence for hundreds of years before being considered a
traditional public forum ignores the versatility of the first
amendment's protections. Such a requirement, in effect,
ties fundamental constitutional rights to historical percep-
tions instead of relying on their underlying meaning. In
determining the existence of a traditional public forum,
the focus should not be so much on the history of the
property in question, but rather on how it compares to
property that has traditionally been used as a place for
self-expression. Using such an approach in this situation,
the clear and powerful similarities between airport termi-
nals and city streets once again supports the conclusion
that terminal buildings are traditional public forums.
Although airport terminals bear a strong resemblance
to city streets, there are several important differences that
separate an airport terminal from streets, parks, and other
traditional public forums. For example, terminals are
subject to a rather limited amount of space, and therefore
their operations are more confined than open city
8 See United States Southwest Africa, 708 F.2d at 764 (noting that National and
Dulles airports contain "many of the facilities and services of a fair-sized munici-
pality"); see also Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Berger, 716 F. Supp.
140, 149 n.9 (D.NJ. 1989) (plaintiff argued that an airport terminal is the modem
equivalent of the ancient "city gate" which has long been recognized as a place for
the exchange of views and ideas), rev'd in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1990).
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streets.8 ' Additionally, air travel inherently involves vari-
ous security risks and safety hazards not found else-
where. 2 These differences should not serve to remove
terminal complexes from public forum status, however,
for they may be taken into account and guarded against by
appropriate, narrowly tailored regulations. Arguably, the
exercise of first amendment rights in any public forum,
and not just airports, will always entail some type of po-
tential hazard or some possible disruption to an orderly
society. Yet, these concerns simply do not justify restrict-
ing the public's historic and democratic right to use public
forums as a place for exchanging ideas and information.
In sum, the court's analysis in Dade County fails to war-
rant the conclusion that municipal airport terminals are
nonpublic forums. Instead, the clear judicial consensus
among the federal courts that terminal buildings are pub-
lic forums, along with the strong arguments in favor of
this position, compel a finding that airport terminals are
public forums that deserve the highest degree of first
amendment protection. With the forum status of airports
now resolved, the next section of this Comment will dis-
cuss, first, the general constitutional standards governing
the state's power to regulate self-expression in public fo-
rums, and second, how these standards have been applied
to specific examples of airport rules.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING FREE
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS IN PUBLIC FORUMS
As Justice Roberts noted in Hague v. Committee for Indus-
trial Organizations,3 the right of freedom of speech in a
public forum is not absolute, but relative, and may be reg-
ulated in order to protect the interests of society.84 Al-
a, See Berger, 716 F. Supp. at 150 ("[T]here is a limited amount of space to which
the airport must confine its operations for the purposes of air travel.").
82 See id. Airport authorities must consider "various safety hazards and security
risks inherent in the nature of air travel and mass transportation." Id.
s 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See supra note 11 for a discussion of this case.
84 Hague, 307 U.S. at 516. The Court specifically stated that the righi to free
speech on public property "may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not abso-
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lowing anyone to do or say whatever he pleases in a public
forum could prove chaotic and therefore, some method of
control over activities in these areas must be permitted.
Given the important functions a public forum performs in
a democratic community, however, any law that infringes
upon the exercise of first amendment rights in this type of
forum must be closely and carefully examined.8 5
As outlined earlier, when the Supreme Court in Perry
identified the three types of forums,86 it also supplied
guidelines concerning the scope of the state's power to
curtail expressive activity in each of these three catego-
ries. In traditional public forums, the Court held that
"the government may not prohibit all communicative ac-
tivity" and that content-neutral regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression are allowable only if they
"are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. ' 87 The Court also held that these same
standards were to apply to a designated public forum as
well, provided that the government kept the facility open
to the public as a place for self-expression.88
Limitations upon free speech activities in public forums
will not be upheld by a mere showing that some legitimate
governmental interest will be affected. 89 Instead, the law
lute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order ... ." Id.
85 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("We long have recognized that sig-
nificant encroachments on First Amendment rights ...must survive exacting
scrutiny.").
Il See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three
distinct types of government owned property.
87 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Content-based regulations, on the other hand, must be
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve
that end." Id. Most airport regulations restricting free speech, including those
discussed in this Comment, do not discriminate on the basis of content. This
somewhat "higher" standard, therefore, does not usually apply and will not be
further examined.
8 Id. at 46. The Court expressly held, "[a]lthough a state is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the [designated public forum], as long as
it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public fo-
rum." Id.
,9 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. In discussing disclosure requirements imposed upon
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or regulation must bear a "substantial relation" 90 to a
"weighty" state interest.9' Examples of significant gov-
ernmental interests that have been recognized by the
Supreme Court include the state's interest in physical
maintenance and aesthetics, 92 as well as its interest in rais-
ing revenue.93 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held
that a state's interest in protecting the safety and conven-
ience of persons using a congested public forum is a valid
governmental objective. 4
While a time, place, and manner regulation must be
limited in scope, it will be considered narrowly tailored
"[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government's inter-
est .... The regulation need not be the least intrusive
means of promoting the substantial state interest,96 and a
court should not declare a regulation invalid merely be-
cause it concludes that the interest could be served by
some other less speech-restrictive method.9 7
Using these general constitutional guidelines, the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal have upheld several airport
campaign contributions and expenditures, the Court stated, "We long have rec-
ognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights ... cannot be
justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest." Id.
- See Gibson v. Florida Legislature Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (holding
that in order to be valid, regulations that infringe on rights protected by the first
amendment must "convincingly show a substantial relation between the [goal]
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest").
91 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("The right to use
a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.").
92 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
In upholding a National Park Service rule prohibiting camping in the Mall in
Washington D.C., the Court stated that "the regulation narrowly focuses on the
Government's substantial interest in maintaining the park in the heart of our Cap-
ital in an attractive and intact condition .. " Id.
" See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
651 (1981) (state of Minnesota recognized as having a substantial interst in the
orderly movement of a large crowd and in avoiding congestion at the state
fairgrounds).
95 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989).
- Id. at 2757-58.
91 Id. at 2758. The Court warned, however, that this standard "does not mean
that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Id.
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regulations governing the time, place, and manner of ex-
pression. Examples of these regulations include the fol-
lowing: prohibition on the distribution of leaflets in the
"fingers" of terminals leading to and from the arrival and
departure gates;98 the exclusion of literature distribution
and solicitation from proscribed terminal areas where
travellers become part of a captive audience or where air-
port officials are concerned about security measures; 9
emergency declarations providing that literature distribu-
tion cease for the duration of the emergency; 0 0 prohibi-
tion of the erection of tables, chairs or other structures in
airport areas other than in leased space; l0 ' and a ban on
interference with or obstruction of persons moving
through clearly specified areas of the airport. 0 2 In all of
the above-mentioned instances, the federal appellate
courts found that the regulations defined the important
state interests to be protected, and that the restrictions
were not overly broad in scope or application.
Similarly, the courts of appeals have employed these
constitutional standards to strike down ordinances which
were not carefully designed to further substantial govern-
mental interests in preserving the use of airports for air
traffic and commerce. Examples of these unconstitutional
regulations include: a provision stating that only conces-
sionaires or lessees may sell for commercial purposes; 0 3
prohibition of solicitation by more than one person at a
time; 10 4 a ban on "disturbances" that interfere with the
ability of airport users to hear announcements and trans-
98 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
- International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d
263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1978). Travellers became a part of a captive audience, for
example, when standing in line. The court also mentioned areas of limited space,
such as doorways or escalators, as appropriate areas for such regulation. Id.
1- Id. at 270-71.
10, Id. at 270. The court stated that this prohibition did not "facially restrict the
exercise of guaranteed rights" and was therefore constitutionally permissible. Id.
102 Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed,
458 U.S. 1124 (1982).
-a Rochford, 585 F.2d at 269-70.
104 Id.
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act business;105 a four hour time limit for literature distri-
bution;10 6 a limitation on the number of persons who may
distribute literature; 0 7 and a requirement that all solici-
tors pay a six dollar daily fee.'0 8
As the above examples illustrate, the large number of
airports in this country has resulted in a great number of
ordinances being promulgated and subsequently chal-
lenged in the federal courts. Since this Comment is in-
tended to serve as a broad overview of first amendment
protection in the context of municipal airport terminals, it
will not attempt to analyze each of the numerous court
decisions examining the constitutionality of various regu-
lations that restrict expressive activity. Rather, this sec-
tion will focus on three examples of airport rules limiting
self-expression. The first two types of regulations to be
examined are absolute bans on first amendment activities
and ordinances that leave the approval of communicative
activities to the complete discretion of an individual.
These have been chosen to demonstrate how the constitu-
tional standards governing public forums, while very gen-
eral and imprecise, have nevertheless provided enough
instruction to render certain practices undoubtedly un-
constitutional. The third type of regulation, permit sys-
tems requiring advance registration, on the other hand,
serves to show how courts often have a difficult time prop-
erly characterizing free speech restrictions and uniformly
applying the broad language of the Supreme Court
guidelines.
A. Absolute Bans on First Amendment Activities
As previously discussed, the case of Board of Airport Com-
105 Id.
I- Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973).
107 Id.
108 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 633; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
113 (1943) (licensing fee of $1.50 per day required of door-to-door solicitors
found unconstitutional since it was "a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privi-
lege granted by the Bill of Rights").
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missioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. 109 involved the
constitutionality of an airport board's resolution prohibit-
ing all first amendment activities from the central terminal
of the Los Angeles International Airport." l0 After con-
cluding that the airport was a traditional public forum,'
the federal district court found the resolution to be un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad." 12 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit agreed that the resolution was too sweeping
in scope and was thus facially unconstitutional." 3 The
court noted that the only governmental interest set forth
by the airport board to justify its ban was a Los Angeles
city charter provision requiring the board to maintain
LAX strictly for air travel use. 14 While the city may have
been sincere in its desire to preserve the airport exclu-
sively for transportation purposes, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that such a desire was not substantial or important
enough to warrant the absolute ban. Specifically, the
court stated, "[t]he Board has not shown that its desire to
limit the uses of the terminal facilities to airport-related
purposes is sufficiently compelling to justify the uniform
and absolute prohibition on all First Amendment activity
in the [Central Terminal Zone.]"' 15
On review by the Supreme Court, the resolution once
again failed to survive judicial scrutiny. The Court fo-
cused its attention on the unbound parameters of the res-
olution and observed that the resolution was not limited
to those activities that might interfere with or disrupt the
movement of travellers within the terminal. 1 6 Instead,
the resolution was so all-encompassing that it could be in-
,o 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
1, See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of
Jews for Jesus II.
I See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
112 Jews for Jesus 1, 785 F.2d at 792.
,i Id. at 795.
I,4 Id. The Los Angeles city charter instructed the board to operate LAX only
for "promotion and accommodation of air navigation and air commerce and uses
incidental thereto." Id.
115 Id.
I",Jewsfor Jesus II, 482 U.S. at 574.
terpreted to prohibit reading, talking, or clothing
designed to make some kind of "statement."" 17 Theoreti-
cally, every individual within the central terminal might be
engaged in first amendment activity and, therefore, be in
violation of the sweeping ordinance."18 Additionally, the
Court declared that the resolution could not be "saved"
by an interpretation limiting its scope or application since
the resolution's wording left no room for a narrowing
construction. " 9
The ruling of the Supreme Court inJewsforJesus II dem-
onstrates that any complete ban of expressive activity in
public airports will be struck down as constitutionally im-
permissible. Courts are unable to reconcile such broad
ordinances with the exacting constitutional standards ap-
plicable to free speech restrictions in public forums. Ab-
solute bans are far too sweeping in light of the
requirement that restraints on self-expression be narrowly
tailored and not substantially broader than necessary.
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court specifically stated,
"no conceivable governmental interest would justify such
an absolute prohibition of speech."'' 20
B. Discretionary Denials of Expressive Activities
Another unconstitutional practice was illustrated by the
procedure used to restrict expressive demonstrations at
Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, discussed in the
case of Jamison v. City of St. Louis.' 2 ' Injamison, a former
airline employee was denied permission by the airport di-
rector to protest silently in the concourse. 22 Jamison, the
117 Id. at 574-75.
11" Id. The Court stated, "[u]nder such a sweeping ban, virtually every individ-
ual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some
First Amendment activity." Id. at 575.
119 Id. at 575-577. The Court found that "the words of the resolution simply
leave no room for a narrowing construction." Id. at 575.
120 Id.; see also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
An outright ban on the use of a public forum for expressive purposes can seldom,
if ever, be justified. Id.
121 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988).
122 Id. at 1281.
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former employee, wished to protest his dismissal by TWA
by standing on the terminal floor with a sign reading
"TWA discriminates against the handicapped."''2 3 Jami-
son turned in a written request describing his intended
action and its peaceful nature to the airport's director,
Col. Leonard Griggs. Griggs denied his request, how-
ever, without explanation. 124
Although the St. Louis Airport Authority had a written
rule governing the exercise of constitutional freedoms
and the solicitation of funds at the airport, 25 this rule was
no longer in use, and Griggs testified that he did not rely
on it in refusing Jamison's request. 26 Instead, the city
empowered Griggs, as director of the airport, to prohibit
any and all activities which were, in his opinion, not in the
best interests of the airport. 27 Griggs exercised this dis-
cretionary power in denying Jamison's request.
The Eighth Circuit examined the validity of this "pol-
icy" and found it unconstitutional in two respects. First,
the city's grant of "complete and unguided discretion" to
Griggs in determining which expressive activities to allow
12 Id. Jamison alleged he was fired as a result of his being mentally ill. Id.
124 Id. The full text of this written request read as follows:
Dear Colonel Griggs, This is a formal request for written permission
to protest my discriminatory discharge from employment with Trans
World Airlines. I would like to picket at the foot of concourse C,
near the glass wall, to be sure that I do not obstruct any passenger
traffic, which I assure you is not my intention. I also do not intend to
solicit funds, distribute literature, willfully engage passengers in
conversation, or cause any disturbance what-so-ever. I only desire
to remain in a stationary position with a poster in my hand, and in
doing so exercise my First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
Your prompt written reply to this request would be appreciated.
Id. at 1281-82 n.2.
12- Id. at 1282. Solicitation Rule 1.05 specifically provided that individuals or
organizations wishing to exercise their constitutional rights "shall be protected in
such activities, provided that the same do not constitute commercial activities and
do not result in interference with transportation functions of the Airport." Id.
The rule further required that such persons deliver a written notice to the director
for his approval at least seven days prior to the proposed activity. Id.
126 Id.
121 Id. Griggs was instructed to use his "general discretion to disallow any activ-
ities that in his opinion would not be in the best interests of the airport or persons
using it." Id.
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was labelled as "unconstitutional censorship."' 128 Such a
delegation of authority made the exercise of constitu-
tional freedoms completely dependent upon the subjec-
tive whim of an individual. Second, the court ruled that
this procedure was not narrowly drawn to promote sub-
stantial governmental interests.' 2 9 The Eighth Circuit
concluded its analysis by stating, "[a]ppellees have failed
to justify this practice, and we can discern no compelling
government need that would warrant such a drastic exclu-
sion of speakers from a public forum."'' 30
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Jamison resembled an
earlier Fifth Circuit ruling in the case of Fernandes v. Lim-
mer. 13 ' Fernandes concerned the validity of a comprehen-
sive ordinance that governed the distribution of literature
and fund solicitation in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (D/FW) air-
port complex.' 32 Among its provisions, the ordinance re-
quired that all persons who wished to solicit funds or pass
out literature apply for and obtain a permit issued by the
airport's executive director.'3 Section 4A(c)(4) of the or-
dinance specifically allowed the director to deny a permit
whenever he had "good reason" to believe that its issu-
ance would jeopardize the safety or welfare of the travel-
ling public.13 4
The Fifth Circuit struck down this section of the regula-
tion as unconstitutional because it based an individual's
right to exercise his freedom of speech wholly upon the
128 Id. at 1284; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-
53 (1969) (city ordinance giving municipal commission unbridled authority to is-
sue or withhold parade permits struck down as unconstitutional).
-2 Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1284. The court specifically noted that Griggs routinely
denied all protest and solicitation requests except those accompanied by a court
order. Id.
130 Id.
13, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982).
132 Id. at 623.
,3 Id. at 638.
14 Id. at 631. The ordinance instructed the director to refuse a permit applica-
tion "when there is good reason to believe that the granting of the permit will
result in a direct and immediate danger or hazard to the public security, health,
safety or welfare." Id.
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subjective judgment call of the airport's director. 3 5 The
ordinance never defined what was and was not a "good
reason"; therefore, the approval of expressive activity, as
injamison, was completely dependent upon the unguided
discretion of a particular individual. The court elaborated
that the ordinance, in relying so heavily on the director's
discretion, was not "specifically and narrowly circum-
scribed" as required by the Constitution.13 6 It also noted
that the Supreme Court had repeatedly rejected similar
attempts to condition first amendment guarantees upon
an official's subjective determination.'1 7 The Fernandes
court did, however, state that a much more narrowly
drawn regulation, which supplied specific, objective crite-
ria that the director was bound to follow, might pass a
constitutional inquiry. 13 8
The analysis and holdings ofJamison and Fernandes leave
little doubt that airport regulations which allow an airport
official to prohibit expressive activity in accordance with
his own subjective judgment, and which provide the offi-
cial with no objective criteria, are not constitutionally
valid. While the public forum standards established by
the Supreme Court in Perry are very general and subject to
interpretation, they nevertheless plainly preclude the le-
gality of such ordinances. These regulations do not fulfill
the requirement of being "narrowly drawn" since no re-
straints are placed upon the decisions of the official. In-
stead, he may act as he pleases and deny an individual's
constitutional rights if he deems it "necessary." Phrases
that superficially attempt to qualify this absolute discre-
tion, such as "if he believes there to be a compelling rea-
"35 Id.
136 Id.
'17 Id. The court stated, "[t]his type of unbridled discretion has been con-
demned time and time again by the Supreme Court." Id.; see also Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (city ordinance which made it an offense to "solicit"
citizens to become members of any organization that required fees or dues with-
out first receiving a permit from the mayor and city council held unconstitutional
because it made the enjoyment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
speech contingent upon the will of the mayor and council).
- Id. at 632.
son," will not cure this defect since the determination of
what constitutes a "compelling reason" still remains
within the personal discretion of the official. In order to
be constitutional, any airport regulation that permits an
official to deny a person's freedom of speech must limit
the official's discretion by establishing narrow, objective
criteria directly related to an important state interest
which the official is obliged to follow.
C. Advance Notice and Identification Requirements
As demonstrated in the preceding subsections, the con-
stitutional standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Perry concerning public forums may clearly invalidate cer-
tain restrictions imposed on free speech in airports. Un-
like the ordinances discussed inJews For Jesus and Jamison,
however, most airport regulations limiting self-expression
are not so broadly written or so restrictive as to be facially
invalid under the first amendment. Instead, the constitu-
tionality of most challenged ordinances will depend upon
a particular court's characterization of the regulations and
its application of the constitutional standards to them.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a regulation deemed
constitutional by one federal court would also be upheld
by another. A good example of how courts may treat the
same type of airport regulation differently is provided by
permit systems which require persons who wish to com-
municate their views to first register well in advance with
airport authorities and obtain a permit. These systems, in
one form or another, are fairly common. 39 Therefore,
the question of their constitutionality has practical signifi-
cance to airports across the country. While some courts
have upheld this type of regulation, the Ninth Circuit has
specifically declared it invalid.
139 For examples of airport ordinances incorporating such permit systems, see
Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 638-40; International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 834-40 (5th Cir. 1979); International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 676-77 (W.D. Pa. 1977); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 178 n.3 (W.D.
Mo. 1977).
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1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit directly confronted the question of
advance notice in the case of Rosen v. Port of Portland.'4 0
Rosen concerned the constitutionality of an ordinance re-
quiring persons who wished to exercise their first amend-
ment rights at the terminal of the Portland International
Airport to register in advance with airport officials.'
4
'
The ordinance, enacted by the governing body of the Port
of Portland, called for at least one business day's notice of
an intent to protest, demonstrate, distribute literature, or
"otherwise communicate with the general public.' 42 In
140 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
'41 Id. at 1244.
142 Id. at 1245. Section 2.4 read as follows:
Section 2.4 NON-COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
No person shall distribute or display to the general public at the air-
port any written or printed material, or picket, demonstrate, or
otherwise communicate with the general public at the airport except
in the time, and place and manner prescribed by regulations
adopted by the Port.
Id. Section 6 further provided the following:
6 NON-COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
6.1 Non-commercial activity is communication with the public on
political, religious, social, economic or similar topics of general pub-
lic interest. Non-commercial activity is the exercise of the funda-
mental constitutional right of free expression. The communication
may be verbal or by distributing literature, picketing, demonstrating
or other means. No donations or contributions may be requested,
nor may any item or material be sold. The mere distribution of liter-
ature which in the text requests funds will be deemed a non-com-
mercial activity as long as the funds are not accepted at the airport.
6.2 Any person may engage in non-commercial activity at the airport
by giving notice to the airport manager at least one business day in
advance of the planned non-commercial activity.
6.3 The initial notice given by any person shall be in writing and
shall include:
(a) The name, address and telephone number of the person spon-
soring the non-commercial activity, if any.
(b) The name, address and telephone number of the responsible in-
dividual to whom the Port should address any communications re-
garding the non-commercial activity.
(c) A general description of the nature of the planned non-commer-
cial activity (e.g., passing out leaflets, personal conversations, picket-
ing, etc.).
(d) The number of individuals expected to participate and the date,
hours and location at the airport of the non-commercial activity.
addition, the ordinance required the advance notice to in-
clude the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
"sponsoring," as well as "responsible," persons. 43
Moishe Meyer Rosen, Chairman of Jews for Jesus, was ar-
rested for violating this regulation when he started dis-
tributing religious literature at the Portland airport
terminal. 44  He later brought suit against the Port of
Portland, claiming that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional on its face under the first and fourteenth
amendments. '45
After outlining the general constitutional standards that
govern restrictions on expressive activities in public fo-
rums, 4 6 the Ninth Circuit discussed the concept of "prior
restraints" on the exercise of first amendment rights. 47
The court stated that these restraints, designed to block
acts of self-expression before they can occur, bear a heavy
presumption against their constitutional validity since
they have historically presented the most severe infringe-
ment on an individual's right to free expression. 48 Also,
,43 Id.; see supra note 142 for the identification requirements set forth in Sections
6.2 and 6.3 of the ordinance.
144 Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1244.
,45 Id. at 1245.
146 See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
standards.
147 Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1246-47. The doctrine of prior restraint has its origins in
sixteenth-century England where a licensing system required that all books obtain
the approval of a government censor before being published. Unlike subsequent
punishment, prior restraints ban expressive activity before it can reach the public
and thus severely restrain public debate and knowledge. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of this concept, see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 J. LAw &
COMTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955); see also Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE
LJ. 409 (1983).
148 Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1247. The court observed that, "prior restraints on
speech and publications are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights." Id.; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445
U.S. 308, 317 (1980) (statute authorizing temporary injunctions against the show-
ing of obscene movies held unconstitutional in part because it allowed the injunc-
tions to be of indefinite duration based on a mere showing of probable success on
the merits); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1975) (gag order
issued by judge of a multiple murder trial that restrained journalists from publish-
ing or broadcasting accounts or confessions made by the accused unanimously
held unconstitutional); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1970) (government not allowed to prevent newspapers from publishing the so-
1990] COMMENTS 1103
1104 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
unlike rules that regulate the time, place, and manner of
expression, the court determined that prior restraints
must be "carefully circumscribed" and constitute the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state inter-
est. 149 Pursuant to this principle, the court found that it
was unconstitutional to condition peaceful demonstra-
tions and communicative activity in airports on a require-
ment of advance registration. 50
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit placed
great reliance on the Supreme Court's ruling in Thomas v.
Collins,' 5 where the Court held that a registration require-
ment for labor organizers wishing to address a meeting of
workers was an unconstitutional prior restraint. 5 2 The
Ninth Circuit also heavily emphasized that the Portland
ordinance drastically burdened free speech and stifled
spontaneous expression. By requiring every person who
wished to exercise his first amendment rights to come to
the airport at least one business day in advance, the over-
all effect of the ordinance was to discourage speech of any
kind.153 Many people who wish to pass out literature or
called "Pentagon Papers" despite concerns over possible interference with na-
tional security); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1970) (court order restraining OBA from distributing leaflets that criticized
Keefe, a real estate broker, for encouraging racially motivated panic sales found to
be unconstitutional prior restraint); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963) (circulation of lists of "objectionable" publications to local police de-
partments by the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth
deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint in that it caused the suppression of the
sale and circulation of the books included in the lists).
,-Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1250. The court stated prior restraints may be permitted
"only when the infringement is minimal and there is a compelling governmental
interest which cannot be protected by any other means." Id.
- Id. at 1247. The court specifically declared, "[wle find the requirement of
advance registration as a condition to peaceful pamphleteering, picketing, or
communicating with the public to be unconstitutional." Id. The court, however,
limited this holding to the regulation of individuals and small groups and refused
to decide whether advance notice requirements might be justified for large groups
of demonstrators. Id. at 1248 n.8.
--' 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
152 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 540. The Supreme Court expressly stated, "[w]e think a
requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech
to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the require-
ments of the First Amendment." Id.
" Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249.
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protest a recent governmental action, for example, might
not bother to do so if they have to make a special trip to
the airport and identify the specifics of their proposed ac-
tivity in advance.
The defense counsel in Rosen raised several points in an
attempt to justify the Port's regulations. First, the Port
argued that speakers who communicate a controversial or
offensive message may need extra police protection that
advance notice would help provide. 54 The court ac-
knowledged that speakers who deeply antagonize the gen-
eral public may require special protection from possible
harm, but concluded that the Port's interest in preserving
the peace could not justify such an intolerable infringe-
ment of basic constitutional rights. 55 Noting that it is the
function of free speech to invite dispute and stir emo-
tions, the court stated that the problem of adequate police
protection would have to be addressed by some other
means less offensive to the Constitution. 56
Second, the Port of Portland contended that its ordi-
nance was a constitutionally permissible regulation of the
time, place, and manner of expressive activity, and noted
other court decisions upholding the imposition of ad-
vance notice requirements in the context of parade per-
mits and demonstrations near the White House. 57 The
Ninth Circuit responded that the Port's ordinance was not
a valid time, place, and manner regulation, but instead la-
belled the challenged ordinance as a "prior restraint in-
tended to permit efficient time, place and manner
' Id at 1248.
Id. at 1248-49.
" Id.; see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (holding
that the Constitution "does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful ex-
pression of unpopular views," even if these views invite public dispute or invoke a
negative response); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (free speech may
"best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatis-
faction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger").
"-7 Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1247-48; see, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558
(1964) (advance notice provisions may be permitted in parade permit ordinances);
A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (advance
notice may be required for demonstrations in the environs of the White House).
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regulation."' 5 8 The court reiterated that such restraints
are extremely suspect and may be allowed only if "no
other choice exists."'' 59 Furthermore, while the court
agreed that the advance notice requirements for parade
permits and White House demonstrations discussed in
the judicial decisions cited by the Port succeeded in meet-
ing this exacting standard, the court concluded that the
ordinance in question failed to do so. The appellate court
characterized the parade and White House decisions as
limited exceptions to the general rule and noted that they
all involved "overwhelming governmental interests and
precisely tailored regulations" which were not present in
the Rosen case.' 60 The court noted that since parades vir-
tually close down major transportation arteries, prior no-
tice of parades is essential to rerouting traffic.' 6'
Similarly, advance notice is also necessary for White
House demonstrations because of the overwhelming need
to protect the safety of the President. 62
After rejecting the advance notice provision of the Port-
land ordinance, the Ninth Circuit then directed its atten-
tion to the constitutional validity of the ordinance's
identification requirements. Using the same principles
and reasoning already noted, the court determined that
the identification questions on the registration application
form also imposed an unjustifiably heavy burden on the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the first amendment. 63
The court reasoned that such identification requirements
could easily deter demonstrations by those individuals
who wished to guard their anonymity for personal reasons
58 Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249-50.
'° Id. at 1250.
00 Id. at 1247. The court also stated that advance notice "should be applied to
cover only those instances in which the disruption of public facilities is equivalent
to that inherent in parades on public streets." Id. at 1247 n.7.
161 Id. at 1247.
162 Id. at 1248. The court concluded, "[tIhe exception was made because of the
unique importance attached to assuring the safety of the President." Id.
,- Id. at 1250-51. The Port attempted to analogize its identification require-
ments to those imposed by the Federal Election Law, but the court rejected this
comparison. Id.
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or fear of reprisal.'l  Any interests the Port had underly-
ing this provision were insufficient to warrant such a chil-
ling effect on the freedom of expression.165
2. Fifth and Seventh Circuits
While the Ninth Circuit maintains that advance registra-
tion and identification requirements are unconstitutional
when imposed upon the exercise of free speech in public
airports, other circuit courts of appeals apparently disa-
gree with this position. For example, in Fernandes v. Lim-
mer, 166  the Fifth Circuit eventually struck down a
mandatory permit system, but only because the system
vested too much discretion in the airport director's per-
sonal judgment and lacked procedural safeguards
designed to assure prompt judicial review of permit refus-
als. 167 Had it not contained these "fatal flaws," the permit
system would most likely have been upheld as constitu-
tionally valid despite the presence of advance notice and
identification requirements.
The challenged permit ordinance in Fernandes specifi-
cally mandated that any individual or organization that
desired to solicit funds or distribute literature in the Dal-
las-Ft. Worth International Airport had to first obtain a
permit from the airport's executive director. 168 This per-
mit could only be obtained by filling out an application
form and submitting it to the director at least three days
in advance of the date sought for the solicitation or litera-
164 Id.
16- Id. at 1251; see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of pamphlets unless they included the names of
the person who prepared, distributed, and sponsored them invalidated as an un-
justifiable burden on the right of free expression).
- 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982). For a
discussion of Fernandez, see supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
167 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 628-32. The Supreme Court outlined the procedural
safeguards required of a license/permit system in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51 (1965) (court prescribed standards for expedited judicial review to govern a
state film licensing board's registration of motion pictures).
6 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 638.
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ture distribution. 6 9 The completed application form was
to include the full name and mailing address of the person
performing the proposed activity, as well as the name and
address of any organization that sponsored his pamphlet-
ing and/or requests for donations. °7 0  The form also
called for the exact time and date(s) of the distribution or
solicitation. '7'
In the Fernandes opinion, the Fifth Circuit expressly
noted that prior restraints are normally unconstitutional
and that only in "demanding circumstances" may govern-
mental authorities "deny access to a public forum in antic-
ipation of consequences that may flow from the
contemplated activity."'' 7 2  Furthermore, the court also
observed that other permit systems had been struck down
I d. The full text of Section 4A(b) of the ordinance read as follows:
PERMITS: It shall be unlawful for a Charitable Organization to so-
licit funds on the airport premises without first applying for and ob-
taining a Permit on forms prescribed by the Executive Director or
his representative. The Application shall be submitted to the desig-
nated representative of the Executive Director at least three (3) days
in advance of the first day sought for solicitation, and shall state:
(1) The full name and mailing address of the person or organization
sponsoring, conducting or promoting the fund drive, if the mailing
address is a Post Office Box Number, the actual street address shall
also be stated;
(2) Whether or not the Applicant is a branch or division of a na-
tional organization, and if so the name thereof, and the mailing and
street address of same;
(3) If the Applicant is a Texas corporation, a copy of its corporate
Charter, as amended, shall be furnished; if it is a foreign corpora-
tion, a copy of its Authorization Certificate to do business in the
State of Texas shall accompany the Application;
(4) The purpose or object of the Charitable Solicitation;
(5) The date or dates and hours of the solicitation;
(6) The number of persons to participate in the solicitation and the
true legal name and address of each;
(7) Such other pertinent information found to be necessary by the
designated official to adequately enforce the terms of this
Resolution.
Id. Section 4A(d) of the ordinance required the same information as that pre-
scribed in 4A(b) in order to receive a permit to distribute literature. Id. at 639.
170 Id.; see supra note 169 for the exact identification information required by the
airport regulation.
,7, Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 638.
172 Id. at 628.
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in the past as unconstitutional prior restraints. 7 3 Never-
theless, the court of appeals summarily concluded that the
D/FW ordinance had "little in common with the classic
prior restraint,"' 74 and instead examined the process used
to deny permit applications. By paying such little atten-
tion to the advance registration and identification require-
ments, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it was not
concerned with the presence of these provisions in the
challenged airport regulation. The appellate court appar-
ently felt that such requirements were acceptable, as well
as constitutionally valid, even when imposed in a public
forum such as an airport. The court's reference to an At-
lanta airport ordinance it had reviewed in a previous case
confirms this conclusion. 75 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
cited the Atlanta ordinance as a "model" for a constitu-
tionally valid permit system even though that ordinance
also called for advance notice and identification informa-
tion very similar to that requested in the D/FW permit
application form.176
17 Id.; see, e.g., Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 147 (city parade permit ordinance un-
constitutional on its face); Staub, 355 U.S. at 313 (ordinance requiring organiza-
tions who wished to solicit members to apply for a permit held to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(city ordinance requiring written permission from the city manager in order to
distribute "circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind" ruled un-
constitutionally broad and thus invalid on its face).
174 Fenandes, 663 F.2d at 627.
175 The case the Fifth Circuit referred to was International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979). In Eaves, the Krishna Soci-
ety and William G. Ogle, the president of the Society's Atlanta branch, claimed
that the airport ordinance violated their first amendment rights and sued the At-
lanta police chief for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 815.
176 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 628. The court expressly referred to the Atlanta per-
mit system as "an effective and functioning ordinance .... "d The provisions of
the Atlanta Airport ordinance may be found in the appendix to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Eaves, 601 F.2d at 834-36. Section 3 of the appendix reads as follows:
Section 3. Any person or organization desiring to distribute litera-
ture at the Airport shall first obtain a written permit therefor [sic]
from the Commissioner of Aviation ("Commissioner"). For pur-
poses of obtaining such permit, there shall be submitted to the Com-
missioner a written application setting forth the following:
(a) The full name, mailing address and telephone number of the
person or organization sponsoring, promoting or conducting the
proposed activities;
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Like the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has taken the position that an airport permit system
incorporating advance registration and identification re-
quirements may be constitutionally permissible. In the
case of International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Rochford,117 the Seventh Circuit addressed the constitu-
tionality of a series of regulations promulgated by Chi-
cago's commissioner of aviation. One provision of these
regulations required all persons wishing to solicit contri-
butions and/or distribute literature in Chicago city air-
ports to register beforehand, giving their name and
address, the organization or purpose they represented,
and the terminal in which they planned to exercise their
first amendment rights.' 78 This provision was eventually
(b) The full name, mailing address and telephone number of the
individual person or persons who will have supervision of and re-
sponsibility for the proposed activities;
(c) The subject matter of the proposed distribution or communica-
tion, and the purpose thereof;
(d) A description of the proposed activities, indicating the type of
communication to be involved;
(e) The dates and hours on and during which the activities are pro-
posed to be carried out, and the expected duration of the proposed
activities; and
(f) The number of persons to be engaged in said activities at the
Airport.
Id. at 834. Section 4 of this ordinance further provided that permits, were to be
issued or denied within five days following the receipt of the application. Id.
," 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978). For a detailed examination of this case, see
Note, Although a Municipal Ordinance Governing Airports May Regulate to Protect Citizens
from Undue Annoyance from Religious Sects Canvassing for Converts, such Ordinances Must
be Narrow, Objective, and Definite: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Rochford, 43J. AIR L. & CoM. 875 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Airports May Regulate].
I'l Rochford, 585 F.2d at 273. Section 2 of the challenged regulation stated as
follows:
A. No person shall distribute literature or solicit contributions un-
less he shall have registered beforehand with the airport manager or
his authorized representative for each day such activities are en-
gaged in.
B. Between 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. each day each person who desires
to distribute literature or solicit contributions shall register in per-
son with the airport manager or his authorized representative, who
shall allot reservations for each day in the sequence each person reg-
isters. Each person shall give his name and address as well as the
organization or purpose he represents and the terminal in which he
will be on that day.
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struck down as unconstitutional because the half-hour
time period available for advance registration was too lim-
ited. 79 The requirement that an individual desiring to ex-
press himself in a city airport must even register at all,
however, was not questioned by either the plaintiff or the
court. The court disposed of the entire advance notice
issue by merely stating that "[t]he Krishna Society does
not contest the fact that registration with airport officials
is required," and by citing two United States Supreme
Court decisions which upheld advance registration re-
quirements in permit systems designed to regulate
solicitors. 80
D. Conclusions
The conflicting positions of the federal courts in regard
C. Each person registered shall receive from the airport manager or
his authorized representative a badge or insignia in a form pre-
scribed by the airport manager. Such badge or insignia shall be
valid only for the day issued. It shall be worn at all times by the
bearer while at the airport, and in a manner visible to the public. It
shall not be transferred to another person, and shall be destroyed by
the bearer when he leaves the airport at the end of the day.
Id.
170 Id. at 269. Persons wishing to register could only sign up between 9:00 and
9:30 in the morning. Id. The court also invalidated the provision because the
allotment of reservations to registrants "at least implies a limitation on the
number of persons who may register; it also indicates official discretion to grant
or deny permission to register." Id.
-o Id. The two U.S. Supreme Court decisions cited by the court were Hynes v.
Mayor of Orandell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940). Neither of these cases, however, directly support the contention that
airports may require persons wishing to exercise their freedom of speech to regis-
ter in advance. Hynes concerned an Orandell, New Jersey ordinance requiring ad-
vance written notice for the issuance of a permit necessary for residential door-to-
door solicitation. Hynes, 425 U.S. at 611-13. Since this regulation governed pri-
vate property, and not government owned land, it cannot be used to uphold the
imposition of such a requirement on free speech in airports. Cantwell involved a
city licensing statute, eventually struck down as unconstitutionally vague, which
required solicitors to apply for and obtain a permit. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02.
While the Court did state that the government may regulate the times, place, and
manner of solicitation on city streets, and that such regulations would not consti-
tute a prohibited prior restraint if it did not "unreasonably obstruct or delay the
collection of funds," neither did the Court expressly approve of advance registra-
tion requirements. Id. at 304-05. Furthermore, the ruling in Cantwell is half a
century old and is directed only at solicitation.
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to advance registration demonstrates the uncertainties
still present in analyzing the constitutionality of airport
ordinances regulating the exercise of first amendment
rights. As noted previously, the courts apparently are in
disagreement as to exactly what type of restriction ad-
vance registration imposes on free speech. While the
Ninth Circuit has characterized preregistration require-
ments as a prior restraint having serious chilling effects
upon individual expression,181 other courts appear to re-
gard such requirements as a legitimate component of per-
missible time, place, and manner restrictions. 8 2 This
disagreement is significant in that, according to the Ninth
Circuit, prior restraints historically have been considered
the greatest threat to the exercise of free speech and,
therefore, are subject to even greater levels of constitu-
tional scrutiny than time, place, and manner limita-
tions. 83 Such restraints must not be merely narrowly
tailored to achieve a substantial state interest, a strict stan-
dard itself, but must be absolutely necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental objective.
One reason contributing to this disagreement is the
confusion surrounding the concept of prior restraints.
Specifically, exactly what type of restrictions will rise to
the level of a prior restraint, and just how necessary such
restraints must be in order to be considered valid, is un-
certain. 84 The Supreme Court has never issued a com-
prehensive definition of the term, or even attempted to
thoroughly explain the concept, leading one commenta-
tor to conclude that the entire prior restraint doctrine
should be abandoned. 85
1" See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
182 For example, in Rochford, the Seventh Circuit held that only the half-hour
registration period was a prior restraint, not the registration requirement in gen-
eral. Rochford, 585 F.2d at 269.
,83 See supra note 148-149 and accompanying text.
184 See Emerson, supra note 147, at 655. "There is, at present, no common un-
derstanding as to what constitutes 'prior restraint.' ".
183 SeeJeffries, supra note 147, at 409. The author of this article argues that the
doctrine of prior restraint "is so variously invoked and discrepantly applied, and
It is the opinion of this author that the current contro-
versy over the validity of advance registration require-
ments be resolved by the adoption of regulations which
call for limited registration by individual demonstrators
immediately prior to the proposed expressive activity.
Such a regulation should require a person desiring to
publicly express his views or solicit funds in an airport ter-
minal to first proceed to the office of the airport manager
and give only his name, a description of the contemplated
activity and its duration, and the area of the terminal in
which he will be located. The registrant would then be
allowed to immediately begin his communication with the
public. Additionally, the regulation should expressly state
that a person may not be denied permission to carry out
the proposed activity so long as it does not directly violate
any existing time, place, and manner restrictions.18 6
There are several reasons supporting the adoption of
the above described registration requirement. First, since
it is not remotely designed to block self-expression before
it can occur, such a requirement should not be considered
a prior restraint, even by the Ninth Circuit. While per-
sons still must register, they will not be prevented from
almost immediately expressing their beliefs since the pro-
posed requirement incorporates no waiting period. Fur-
ther, airport officials will have virtually no discretion to
refuse them permission unless other valid time, place, and
manner restrictions prohibit the demonstration.
Second, this type of registration will still contribute to
the security and efficient operation of airport terminals.
so often deflective of sound understanding, that it no longer warrants use as an
independent category of First Amendment analysis." Id. at 437.
18c A proposed airport regulation incorporating a registration requirement sim-
ilar to the one suggested here appeared earlier in Note, Airports May Regulate, supra
note 177, at 891. It should also be noted that the registration system offered by
this Comment would apply only to individuals, and not to large groups of demon-
strators. The presence of a large group in an airport terminal is much more dis-
ruptive than that of scattered individuals and may pose other serious problems.
Therefore, in the case of group registration, airport authorities may have an ex-
tremely legitimate need for more notice and/or the power to limit the number of
people demonstrating in a particular area.
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Since airport authorities will have knowledge of expres-
sive activities before they occur, precautions designed to
prevent potential violence and disruptive activity can be
undertaken. For example, speakers and/or pamphleteers
supporting a controversial or inflammatory cause could
be identified so that a guard could watch over their activi-
ties and defuse any violent public reaction. Additionally,
by requiring persons wishing to exercise their first amend-
ment rights to register immediately beforehand, these in-
dividuals could receive a copy of airport rules containing
relevant time, place, and manner restrictions before they
demonstrate. Upon reading the rules, they would dis-
cover what activities and areas are off-limits to them and
would therefore not unknowingly break airport
regulations.
The third and final reason supporting the proposed re-
gistration requirement is that it alleviates much of the
"chilling effect" on free speech imposed by other advance
registration ordinances. Unlike registration rules that re-
quire persons to make a special trip to the airport before
they can advertise their views, the proposed requirement
allows individuals to notify airport authorities and then
demonstrate immediately upon their decision to utilize
their first amendment rights. Furthermore, the suggested
registration system does not contain any identification re-
quirements apart from the registrant's name. Individuals
who wish to protect the anonymity of their sponsoring or-
ganization, or who do not want to reveal their address and
telephone number, will thus not be dissuaded from com-
municating their beliefs and ideas.
In summation, the registration requirement suggested
by this Comment confers most of the benefits provided by
advance registration, while at the same time permitting al-
most spontaneous expression by persons present in air-
port terminals. This does not mean, however, that this
proferred registration system is beyond criticism. Sup-
porters of advance registration may assert that airport of-
ficials need more notice to prepare for potentially
disruptive activities than this system would provide, and
that authorities should have at least some discretion to
bar registrants whom they have reason to believe will seri-
ously hinder the movement of travellers. Those who ad-
vocate the abolition of any registration requirement, on
the other hand, may contend that any regulation that in-
hibits the spontaneity of self-expression seriously under-
mines the proscriptions of the first amendment and
should therefore not be permitted. The proposed regis-
tration requirement, however, does not ignore such argu-
ments, but instead attempts to balance these competing
viewpoints. Realizing the importance of spontaneous ex-
pressive activity in public forums such as airports, this re-
quirement abolishes the waiting periods and possibilities
of denial present in existing regulations incorporating ad-
vance registration. Yet airports, despite being a public fo-
rum open to the free exchange of information and ideas,
also serve an important transportation function which the
government has the right, and even duty, to protect. The
proposed registration system therefore requires that air-
port demonstrators first give notice of their intentions in
order to aid airport officials in preserving and maintaining
the orderly flow of passengers and traffic in busy airport
terminals.
11151990] COMMENTS

